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Abstract
Background: Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is currently causing various challenges for all countries around the
world. Accordingly, the WHO is placing a great emphasis on the global partnership and allinaces to drive countries
towards developing policy guidances and a strategic framework for AMR contatiment. This study thus seeks to
elaborate on the international factors underlying AMR management in Iran.
Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers from the Ministry of health (n = 14), Iran
veterinary organization (n = 4), the national professional associations (n = 3) and researchers (n = 3), between
November 2018 and July 2019. Participants were selected using purposeful and snowball sampling. Interviews were
recorded and transcribed verbatim and were subsequently coded and analyzed thematically using MAXQDA
software (V.18) and reported.
Results: International enabling and predisposing factors were identified in relation to the AMR control in the
country. Enabling factors included knowledge transfer, facilitation in policy agenda setting, formulation and
implementaion process, and AMR monitoring. Predisposing factors, alternatively, encompassed the migration of
infectious patients, trafficking of medicine and livestock from neighboring countries, and the imposed sanctions.
Conclusion: Nowadays, AMR is taken cognizance of as a global challenge, thus to be addressed effectively, needs
an international consensus more than ever. This harmony would not certainly underrate national efforts, but
instead, is needed to reinforce such efforts through e.g. technical and financial assistance. It is suggested for
policymakers to use all available political and legal means such as health diplomacy to establish humanitarian
channels in order to enhance global convention and remove possible barriers as the sanctions and reduce their
adverse consequences for AMR control.
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Background
“Antimicrobial Resistance is a crisis that must be man-
aged with the utmost urgency. As the world enters the
ambitious new era of sustainable development, we can-
not allow hard-won gains for health to be eroded by the
failure of our mainstay medicines.” Dr. Margaret Chan,
former Director-General of the World Health
Organization (WHO) said in the introduction of Global
Action Plan (GAP (on AMR [1]. Moreover, she shed
light on the importance of preserving antimicrobials to
protect our future. Earlier in 2011, the WHO dedicated
the World Health Day of AMR to warn of the danger of
returning back to the pre-antibiotic era, and invited
countries to take urgent actions [2].
It is forecasted that AMR will account for 10 million
deaths per year globally. Low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) will be heavily affected by AMR in a direct
or indirect way [3]. In 2015, the WHO nominated the
Eastern Mediterranean Region as one of the weakest in
combatting AMR due to the lack of national action
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plans, poor awareness, fragmented information systems,
irregular monitoring and surveillance, weak laboratory
capacity, lack of thorough national programs for infec-
tion control and patient safety, inappropriate prescrib-
ing, and counterfeit drugs and medicines [4].
Iran is one of the countries with a high rate of
antimicrobial consumption [5]. This could stem from
the lack of national guidelines for prescription, and
uncontrolled, over-the-counter sale of medicines in-
cluding antimicrobials [6]. Overuse and overprescrib-
ing of antimicrobials is a long-standing problem in
Iran’s health system. Half a century ago, researchers
warned of antimicrobials overuse and the resultant
AMR as a future challenge for Iran’s health system
[7]. This concern is still present, as the National
Committee for Rational Use of Drugs’ (NCRUD (re-
ported that more than 50% of patients have received
antibiotics in 2015 [5]. Although there is no reports
on the inapproriate use of antibiotics in given year,
the NCRUD has considered the percentage itself ir-
rational behavior [5]. Accordingly, Iran has reported
high resistance rates in the bacteria of international
concern such as Escherichia coli (resistance to third-
generation cephalosporins (41%), or Fluoroquino-
lones (54%)), Klebsiella pneumoniae (resistance to
third-generation cephalosporins (48%), or Carbapen-
ems (54%)) [8].
Although the eradication of AMR is impossible, ef-
fective planning and management might reduce its
risks and negative consequences [9]. Iran has formu-
lated a national action plan to combat AMR which is
yet to be ratified. Various organizations and institu-
tions, Ministry of Health and Medical Education
(MOHME) and Iran Veterinary Organization (IVO),
both at macro and micro levels, are somehow in-
volved in AMR surveillance and control. The
MOHME has launched some initiatives including; a
national nosocomial infection surveillance program, a
national committee for deciding on rational prescrib-
ing and drugs usage, a national program for surveil-
ling various pathogens, and setting antimicrobial
restrictions in public and private sectors. The IVO
has also started programs including antibiotics-free
chicken and eggs, monitoring the drugs residues in
animal source food products. Nevertheless, the grow-
ing trend of AMR in the country in previous years
has encountred the health system with a major chanl-
lenge [5, 8]. Many international guidelines and recom-
mendations have been released with regards to AMR
containment [1–3, 8, 10–12], reflecting the import-
ance of the issue for interconnected world in which
humans, animals, water and food work as transporters
of resistant microorganisms. This in turn uncovers
the need for an international and multisectoral
coalition utilizing effective strategies such as health
diplomacy for AMR management [13, 14].
The increased globalization has also borne on the
national policy-making efforts (e.g. for eradication of
polio, tuberculosis or HIV control) [15], paving the
way for a new global dialogue, especially among the
LMIC. Thus, national health policy making and ana-
lysis should take into account such complexities and
also the effect of related stakeholders, as the inter-
national processes and actors could shake the national
policies [14, 15]. Countries might not be able to con-
trol all ill-health related determinants without collab-
orating with others, therefore and in terms of
globalization, there is a need to shape coordination,
cooperation and collaboration on a broad-spectrum of
issues to assist in developing their capacity [15].
Iran is currently involved in various international dip-
lomatic and business relations with neibouring and other
countries and also affected by such factors as sanctions
by some countries [16–18]. Entrance of a large group of
Afghan and Iraqi immigrants to Iran, due to their previ-
ous turbulent situations (caused by persisting wars) in
previous decades, and illegal drug and human trafficking
through the eastern borders with Pakistan and
Afghanistan have influenced the health system in Iran
[15, 19, 20].
While the Global Action Plan (GAP) emphasizes
mostly on One Health approach and an international
collaboration and partnership to tackle the threat of
AMR [1], to the best of our knowledge, no previous re-
search has been carried out to look into the link between
international factors and AMR management in Iran.
This study thus seeks to explore the enabling and pre-
disposing effects of international factors on the AMR
containment policies in Iran.
Methods
Study design and participants
A qualitative research was used to collect data from a
wide range of stakeholders from different organizations,
institutions, national societies, and associations, both at
macro and micro levels, including policymakers, man-
agers, and academics and besides the related national
and local documents.
Sampling and data collection
Participants were recruited using both purposeful and
snowball sampling (n = 24). Maximum variation was
considered to generate a well-rounded view on the topic.
Initially, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were
held, using an interview guide, with key informants. A
number of 14 types of documents on AMR were also
obtained and analysed from the websites of the related
ministries and organisations. The interviewees, identified
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during the documents analysis, were invited via email
and phone call. At the end of each interview, conducted
by MM, participants were asked to introduce those
knowledgeable in their field. The researchers refined the
topic guide, after the first five interviews as pilot inter-
views. All interviews were undertaken in participants’ of-
fices between November 2018 and July 2019 and lasted
for about 55 min. A file containing the introduction, eth-
ical considerations and study objectives was sent to par-
ticipants, together with assurances about confidentiality
and anonymity. All interviews were carried out and ana-
lysed in Persian language, digitally recorded and tran-
scribed verbatim, except one in which notes were taken
instead, because of the participant’s reluctance. Data col-
lection continued until saturation; that is, when no new
findings emerged.
Data management and analysis
Data were analyzed based on thematic analysis [21]
using MAXQDA software (version 18) to facilitate
categorization, storage, and retrieval of information.
While proceeding with the interviews, the analysis was
already in action via reading and re-reading the tran-
scripts and familiarization. The interview transcripts
were read several times for familiarity by MM and EJP.
Initial codes started to emerge shaping the initial the-
matic framework which was then applied to the rest of
data. The codes were then categorized as two main
themes and seven sub-themes, with the final classifica-
tion was approved by all authors after discussing all
discrepancies.
To enhance the trustworthiness, triangulation was
conducted by cross-checking the themes with the
relevant formal documents. Moreover, the initial find-
ings were also sent back to some key interviewees for
assuring content accuracy and clarity (member
checking).
Results
In total, 24 experts including 13 men and 11 women
were interviewed (Table 1). Several international facilita-
tors and barriers were identified as influencing AMR
and its management policies in Iran. These factors have
been categorized under two main themes and seven sub-
theme as illustrated in Table 2.
Enabling factors in the AMR containment
Facilitating policy making process
International advocacy for the AMR agenda setting
The WHO, Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) drew the
attention of health policymakers to the AMR challenge.
The WHO and OIE had selected AMR and food safety
as key themes for world health days in 2011, 2015 and
2017, and urged countries to adopt the recommended
policies in order to control this issue. In 2015, the WHO
launched the global action plan, and called on countries
to develop national action plans based on their require-
ments and resources.
Iran, in line with the WHO, has formulated policies
and developed a national action plan based on the GAP.
A manager from the Deputy of Health stated “Before we
detect this issue based on research and try to address it
as an important problem in the country, the WHO was
the pioneer and urged countries to join and share … ..
We are indebted to the WHO which drew our attention
to this issue” (P5). Another manager also mentioned
“Since 2012, the slogan of the WHO was AMR, we priori-
tized the issue in the country; there was a lot of coordin-
ation and cooperation; many meetings were held at the
Communicable Disease Center for officials in collabor-
ation with the Iran Food and Drug Administration
(IFDA), the Veterinary Organization and the Ministry of
Agriculture, the Health Reference Laboratory,
Table 1 Participants’ information (p1 - p24)
Participants No. Characteristics
Health Deputy of MOHME 5 Policymakers at national level [1–4],
middle-level managers [5]
Deputy of Curative Affairs 3 Policymakers at national level [6–8]
Food and Drug Organization 3 Middle-level organizational agents
[9–11]
Health Reference Laboratory (HRL) 2 High-level managers [12, 13]
Supreme Council for Health and Food Security 1 Middle-level agents of the Ministry
of Health [14]
Iran Veterinary Organization 4 Policymakers at national
level [15–18]
AMR-interested researchers 3 Academics associated with
research [19–21]
National Professional Associations (Iranian Society of Infection Disease and Tropical Medicine (ISIDTM),
Iranian Mycological Society, Iranian Society of Microbiology)
3 Managers [22–24]
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academicians and institutions experts. We aimed to en-
able these experts and managers to tackle the problem”
(P4). Similarly, a manager in IVO said: “The OIE is warn-
ing about AMR crisis as it brought us to the fact of essen-
tial confrontation. The OIE’s emphasis and also the
experience of other countries have alerted us.” (P18).
Cooperation in the establishment of national AMR
surveillance system The WHO has played an effective
role in initiating the national AMR surveillance system
in Iran. According to the records of both the WHO and
the MOHME, a team consisting of two experts from the
WHO Office in Tehran, a leading team from WHO/
EMRO Public Health Laboratories, an AMR technical
team (WHO/HQ), and two experts from the Swedish
Public Health Agency attended in Iran in February 2016.
This consulting team and a group of professionals and
managers from the MOHME visited the Health Refer-
ence Laboratory (HRL) (in the MOHME), the Iranian
Center for Communicable Disease Control (CDC), Cen-
tral and References and Applied Studies (in the IVO)
and hospitals, as the AMR surveillance sites in Mashhad,
Tehran, and Isfahan. They explored and presented the
existing challenges, weaknesses, strengths and capabil-
ities, and introduced a roadmap for the initial launch of
the national AMR surveillance system and its gradual
development. The CDC in collaboration with the HRL
joined the program and took important steps for estab-
lishing the Iranian surveillance system using the Global
AMR surveillance system (GLASS) framework. One par-
ticipant from the Project Executive Team stated “Devel-
oping a national plan in our country is a hard work. By
designing a simple program, the WHO called for coun-
tries to start with. Therefore, we now have a national
plan based on GLASS. Moreover, the WHO has
highlighted some specific microorganisms for follow-up,
but we had modified monitoring procedure of microor-
ganisms and antimicrobials based on our circumstances,
risks and available resoures” (P12).
WHO support for AMR monitoring programs Cur-
rently, the WHO has implemented the Extended-
Spectrum β-Lactamase (ESBL) Monitoring Program in
Iran in collaboration with the AMR Research Center at
Iran University of Medical Sciences, which can generate
good information on this microorganism in humans, an-
imals and environmental ecosystems, as well as it will
promote cross-sectoral coordination in implementing
the national programs. One of the project’s executives
declared “At GLASS, nowadays we only collect informa-
tion at the human level but this project is tricyclic as it
covers animals, humans and environment. In a way, we
are practicing cross-sectoral coordination and starting to
implement large-scale national programs. The WHO fi-
nances the plan, supports data collection and determines
the required materials, meanwhile, we provide the
needed manpower. In addition, we will estimate the
budget that will be allocated for implementing the afore-
mentioned plan” (P4).
The role of the CAC in developing a platform for
promoting cross-sectoral cooperation and improving
national standards The CAC commission has created a
good platform for cross-sectoral cooperation and im-
provement of national standards. Iranian National Stan-
dards Organization is a member of the CAC and starting
with the Codex Intergovernmental Task Force on AMR,
Iran has also taken steps to fight against AMR by
Table 2 Role of international factors on AMR management in IRAN
Theme Sub-themes Codes
Enabling factors in the
AMR containment
Facilitating policy making process ▪ International Advocacy for the AMR agenda setting
▪ Cooperation in the establishment of national AMR surveillance system
▪ WHO Support for AMR monitoring programs
▪ The role of the Codex Alimentarius Committee (CAC) in developing a platform
for promoting cross-sectoral cooperation and improving national standards
Knowledge transfer ▪ Holding workshops and meetings
▪ Easing students’ dispatch for continuing their education
Predisposing factors
for AMR
Neighboring Countries related issues ▪ AMR transmission risk
▪ Medicines and livestock trafficking
Sanctions and the supply of AMR
medical products and technologies
▪ Inflation of medical supplies
▪ Difficulty of payments to the foreign sellers and inward shipping
Sanctions and stewardship ▪ Corruption and lack of transparency
▪ Increased cost of food-producing animals and the effect on antimicrobials over-
use Expediency; preference for the access over quality
Sanctions and financing ▪ Budget reduction for AMR policies
▪ More attention to the curative medicine
Sanctions and research and
knowledge sharing
▪ Quantity and quality of research on AMR
▪ Researchers’ communication with global scientific community
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localizing Codex principal texts like the code of practice
to minimize and contain AMR and also developing
guidelines for risk analysis of foodborne antimicrobial
resistance. A member of the committee said “implemen-
tation of national standards written by the Standard
Organization depends on the link to strong executive bod-
ies such as ministries. Now in Health Reference Labora-
tory, I am in charge of one of the National Mirror Codex
Committees which deals with laboratories. The Codex
helps to implement local standards, recommendations,
and guidelines by creating a link with the Ministries of
Health and Agriculture and their subordinates such as
the the Reference Laboratory and the IFDA or IVO. This
partnership has never been seen before or it has been in
a weak status so far. For example, we didn’t work with
the codex but we joined the committee. In my opinion,
the way forward is better than in the past. We all have
to share our experiences” (P12).
Knowledge transfer
Holding workshops and meetings Strengthening the
knowledge and evidence-based practice of policymakers
and technical experts was the result of the cooperation
of international and local organizations. The WHO Ad-
visory Group on the Integrated Surveillance of AMR
(AGISAR) members in Iran have consulted with author-
ities about the available infrastructure and resources to
better control this issue in food chains. In this regard, a
workshop was organized by the WHO in collaboration
with the Research Institute for Gastroenterology and
Liver Disease at Shahid Beheshti University of Medical
Sciences, Food and Drug Control Reference Laboratories
Center, HRL and CDC in 2015.
Surveillance and control studies of water and food-
borne diseases, and increasing resistance and contribut-
ing factors to related outbreaks were also followed by
the WHO instructors and Iranian experts. WHO-NET
training software was provided to collect and analyze in-
formation about AMR. The workshop was attended by
health deputies of universities, epidemiologists across
the country, and officials at the CDC, veterinarians, en-
vironmental health professionals, and laboratory special-
ists. One of this workshop organizers mentioned “These
workshops were very effective in enhancing our know-
ledge, we have been working for many years on AMR pro-
fessional tests with the WHO’s Global Foodborne
Network office. We showed our expertise, interest and in-
frastructure, then they desired to consider us as a hub in
the region in order to organize these workshops with great
support of the WHO and cooperation of the MOHME”
(P19).
To comply with the reference standards, in terms of
training and capacity-building programs, a workshop on
new methods of screening antibiotics in food-producing
animals had been held in 2018 by experts from the Rikilt
Wageningen UR in Netherland in cooperation with Sha-
hid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences in Tehran,
Iran.
One of the workshop organizers stated “Despite sanc-
tions, memorandum of understanding has been signed
with universities such as the institute for food safety
RIKILT for training our laboratories technichians. In
addition, they sought to maintain a relationship with us
regarding food health …. These courses have raised the
level of our expert’s knowledge” (P13).
Easing students’ dispatch for continuing their
education In collaboration with universities and inter-
national institutions, many Iranian students have been
enrolled in postgraduate studies in microbiology, food
hygiene, veterinary medicine and biotechnology. Those
graduated students could be employed in the field of
AMR as lecturers, researchers and practitioners.
The predisposing factors for the AMR
Bordering countries
AMR transmission risk Extended borders between Iran
and its neighbors Pakistan, Afghanistan, Republic of
Azerbaijan, and Iraq has raised risk of AMR transmis-
sion. For instance, Iran has an old relationships with
Azerbaijan and Iraq due to the cultural and religious
proximity; therefore, a large number of people cross the
border daily for receiving health care or getting their
own needs. One interviewee from the Deputy of Health
mentioned “We have a neighboring country with more
than 2 million malaria cases, more than 90% of them
have been clinically diagnosed without laboratory exam-
ination … no basic treatment … they take medicines of
low quality just for two or three days. So, resistance to-
wards anti-malarials is highy expected in such country.
Incidence of most malaria cases in Iran come from illegal
neighboring immigrants. Also for tuberclusis, 13 percent
of new cases and 17 percent of multi-drug resistant cases
are due to those immigrants” (P8).
Medicines and livestock trafficking Livestock, medi-
cines, and medical equipment trafficking from neighbor-
ing countries accelerates the AMR aggravation in Iran.
A manager in the IVO stated “Trafficking of livestock
from eastern borders is a real problem and should be
highlighted as an urgent. These livestock are not vacci-
nated and deemed as a source for bio-threats that can
transmit diseases to other livestocks inside our country …
…. Unfortunately, the way of smuggling across the bor-
ders is out of control. Now if you want any veterinary
medicine, you can go to one of the shops in [……] square,
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introduce yourself as a farmer; and ask for chloram-
phenicol …. You will get it easily and in any quantity”
(P16).
Sanctions and the supply of AMR medical products and
technologies
Inflation of medical supplies The sanctions-induced
inflation has also reduced the ability to provide quality
medical products needed to combat AMR. An inter-
viewee said “During our meetings with the Minister last
year, we agreed on the supplies we need. Our budget was
approved when the exchange rate was 1 United States
Dollar (USD) = 40000 Iranian Rial (IRR). After escalat-
ing of sanctions, IRR has dropped to one-fourth of its pre-
vious value. Now we can hardly purchase one-fourth of
our needs” (P1). In the same regard, one of the managers
at the Mycological Society pointed out “The resources
constraints have grown and we all feel it … many essen-
tial medications are unavailable for many infections, so
colleagues have been obliged to prescribe alternative
medicines of low quality and more side effects. For ex-
ample, we have a patient suspectus of having aspergil-
losis infection, voriconazole is the first and best choice,
this drug was already expensive before sanctions and
nowadays it became more expensive and hardly to be
found” (P22).
Difficulty of payments to the foreign sellers and
inward shipping Sanctions have led to the disruption of
purchasing and importing laboratory equipment, diag-
nostic tools, antimicrobial drugs and vaccines in the hu-
man and animal sectors which in turn affect the central
bank and money transfers, insurance, ports and ship-
ping, and even trading movement between Iran and
European and American companies. It should be noted
here that some countries may seek to avoid ngative con-
sequences resulting from any transaction with Iran such
as imposing partial sanctions or reducing finaincial aids.
One participant from the Deputy of Health stated “Ac-
cording to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
90% of deaths, and 80% of TB incidence rates should be
reduced by 2030. Such ambitious goals cannot be met in
the light of current circumstances. The WHO emphasizes
the access to new diagnostic tools and short-term treat-
ments, e.g. the automated GeneXpert testing device,
which characterized by high speed of microorganism de-
tection and resistance, and less risk of contamination but
the only manufacturer is American company. We barely
import several devices with the United Nations (UN) as-
sistance over many years. After the end of the global fund
project, the cartridges stocked out and we hardly bought
again. Unfortunately, the sanctions were escalated this
year after the US Company agreed to sell us cartridges
and devices but the embargo on shipping and insurance
companies prevented others to ship cargo to Iran” (P1).
Sanctions and stewardship
Corruption and lack of transparency The increased
trafficking in human and animal medicines, the import
and manufacturing of low-quality, counterfeit equipment
and raw materials, as the signs of corruption and low
transparency, all were somehow encouraged following
the sanctions, exacerbating the AMR in the country.
One respondent from the IVO said “The increased traf-
ficking in human and animal medicines, the import and
manufacturing of low-quality, counterfeit equipment and
raw materials, as the signs of corruption and low trans-
parency, all were somehow encouraged following the
sanctions, exacerbating the AMR in the country” (P17).
Increased cost of food-producing animals and the
effect on antimicrobials overuse The sanctions have
led to the overuse of antimicrobials in the veterinary sec-
tor which resulted in the increasing AMR. Rise in the
prices during the boycott conditions and government’s
attempts in the meantime to preserve the meat prices at
an affordable level for the consumers has coerced the
farmers to increase their profit by any means; e.g. feed-
ing antibiotics to animals to promote specifically their
growth. One participant from the IVO mentioned “With
sanctions, medicines, food and transportation became ex-
pensive and accompanied with an increase in the ani-
mals’ prices. Prices announced by the government were
no longer economical for the farmers, so they have to fend
for themselves (the interviewee used a Persian proverb
(by cheating. They use more antibiotics to avoid casual-
ties, and especially cheap ones to reduce the expenses …
the farmers think that they can’t raise the price but try to
promote the weight gain by adding antibiotics to animals
food” (P17).
Expediency; preference for the access over quality
Sanctions has hampered importing medicines and vac-
cines, equipment, and animal feeds. This has somewhat
led to a rise in the market prices. In such conditions, ac-
cessibility could become more important to the govern-
ment than food quality in short-term perspective. A
respondent from the IVO stated “The sanctions and
their financial consequences have forced the officials to
compromise their important principles. For example in
2012, we have experienced a significant shortage in meats
supply. We imported large quantities of meats from other
countries without checking whether the animals were
slaughtered according to religious and health standards.
In addition, heavy weight chicken (7 kg) have been
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imported without assuring some essential health related
criteria” (P15).
Further problems as the non-standardized agricultur-
ing and the shortages of food-producing animals were
also linked to the sanctions. A manager at the IVO said
“Increasing costs reduces animal’s production and paves
the way for the possible abuse. For example, one-day-old
chicks were out of stock, raised and sold by a group of
foreigners in illegal places which were totally out of our
control system. It was unknown which drugs were fed to
them, and we didn’t know whether withdrawal time was
considered. Actually, it was unclear!” (P17).
Sanctions and financing
Budget reduction for AMR policies With the escal-
ation of sanctions, the MOHME budget for AMR-
related policies has been reduced. One of these policies
was the establishment of the NCRUD. One member in
the committee stated that “We had sufficient budgets be-
fore these sanctions, later, most of these budgets, even for
the clinically-severe cases were significantly cut. The
budget of our committee is also still diminishing after
sanctions as well” (P19). In the same regard, one man-
ager at the Iranian Society of Microbiology added “The
governmental revenues have reduced, which in turn re-
sulted in the lower spending and less employment, mean-
while, we are already suffering from a shortage of
manpower and work overload. For example, 10 techni-
cians are currently working in our laboratory while we
need 20 at least, and this may affect the quality of the re-
sults. At the end of the day, people themselves will be
negatively influenced by these implications” (P23).
More attention to the curative medicine Participants
from the both fields, human and veterinary medicine,
believed that the scarcity of monetary resources due to
the sanctions have drived the authorities to pay more at-
tention to curative care, as it is more urgent, in
budget allocation than prevention and infection control.
One manager in the Deputy of Curative Affairs stated
that “Our hospitals have serious financial hardship, and
these problems usually affect the infection prevention and
control measures, e.g. it reduces the purchase of disinfec-
tants. Even more recently, equipment are being re-used.
The infection control and prevention should not be com-
promised in any condition” (P6).
Sanctions and research and knowledge sharing
Quantity and quality of research on AMR The lack of
research budgets and the sanctions-induced inflation have
squeezed AMR-related research. One researcher said “Re-
search needs money, facilities and communications, also a
range of high quality and reliable materials, unfortunately,
our work will be disrupted as they couldn’t be supplied. As
a result, the outputs of our work will not be authentic nor
feasible” (P21). Another researcher added that “We have
to provide E-test for a research project but it was shocking
for us because of its price. It became so expensive after the
sanctions and then unaffordable” (P19).
Researchers’ communication with global scientific
community Sanction-imposed reduction in the global
diplomatic and economic collaborations with Iran has
also adversely influenced the Iranian academic including
AMR related- community. Sanctions have also disrupted
the interactions of AMR researchers with their col-
leagues in other countries as well as with the inter-
national scientific organizations because of various
difficulties such as visa, travel and residency expenses in
those countries. In terms of publication, their work is
experiencing various hurdles to be published in inter-
national journals. One of the managers at the Iranian
Mycological Society said “Unfortunately, we now have
troubles getting our research published. They see the af-
filiation, immediate reject will be the result in most cases
or at least with many restrictions. Many of my colleagues
have lost contact with their international partners. Yet,
they used both of their experience and equipment that
was no longer possible” (P22).
Discussion
This study has sought to explain the consequences of
international factors for the AMR management policies
and practices in Iran. International factors were briefly
found to be of both enabling and predisposing nature in
relation to the AMR containment. The enabling factors
included knowledge transfer and facilitation in the AMR
policies agenda setting, formulation, implemention, and
monitoring. Predisposing factors, instead, encompassed
the migration of infectious patients, trafficking of medi-
cine and livestock from the neighboring countries, and
the imposed sanctions.
A review on the global health policies shows that the
national and international political support for global
health programs has not been equal, some receiving
more support e.g. family planning and HIV/AIDS, some
other less, e.g. malnutrition and pneumonia, despite of
its high burden and severity [22].
The role of political and international factors in health
has been always influential [14, 15, 23–25]. For instance,
the role of diplomacy track in relation to the modern
vaccine record seems impressive, e.g. in the eradication
of smallpox and polio to some extent. A number of
health related achievements emerged when the USA and
USSR put their conflict aside during the Cold War. Simi-
larly, the dialogue that took place between USA and Iran
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under the joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA)
agreement between 2014 and 2016, opened the door for
some accomplishments in public health [24]. However,
following the exit of the USA from the JCPOA and initi-
ation of new sanctions in 2018, such efforts were under-
mined [26].
AMR has topped the global agenda for the recent few
years and is one highly affected by international interac-
tions. The efforts of various actors ranging from NGOs,
governmental bodies, and international organizations
have made the issue well-known to the nonhealth and
nonscientific communities and a special attention had
been also paid to this issue from the international polit-
ical bodies [12, 14]. Foreign actors similarly have played
an active role in AMR policymaking in Iran along with,
sustainable political support, effective policies, technol-
ogy and efficient operating systems are essential to tackle
this issue [22].
The imposed sanctions during the last 40 years have
played a key role in relation to all health related activ-
ities [16–18, 20, 27], especially to the AMR efforts in the
country; unilateral sanctions by the U.S.A. They have a
destructive role in inability to supply the required vital
elements for AMR contatinment. These sanctions are
not a new issue for Iran as the internationally multilat-
eral long-lasting sanctions imposed by the UN and the
EU have begun in concurrent with the Iranian Revolu-
tion in 1979 [16, 18, 26]. Although the article 41 of the
UN Charter authorizes the total or partial termination of
economic sanctions with the targeted countries for the
nonviolent measures, the adverse consequences of sanc-
tions still persist especially in the case of AMR in Iran,
as in the case of some other countries [13].
Although the countries imposing sanctions claim an
exemption for health related products, the history of
sanctions in different countries confirms that health sys-
tems are still adversely affected [17]. Sanctions may not
directly target health systems, but the economic associ-
ated hardship has been affecting the Iranian health sys-
tem to combat AMR. This is for instance, as to the poor
capablility to access the sophisticated antimicrobial
drugs produced through advanced technologies. In Iran,
the 4% of imported drugs represent 40% of the total
value of the Iranian pharmaceutical market [16, 27]. And
also due to the sanctions and lack of medical products,
diffusion disk is the widely-used test in Iran, and the
MIC or E-test tests are performed only in few hospitals
and research centers [28].
It should be noted that AMR is not just a problem that
remains within the confines of medical centers. Arrival
of just one patient with a resistant microorganism to a
hospital may frustrate many years of protection and in-
fection control strategies against AMR [12]. AMR is
formed and developed in a complex cycle in different
ecosystems, therefore, the global community should
focus on its containment as a part of a broader agenda
for universal health coverage and global health security
[29]. Regular inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral meetings
as an important mechanism for sharing information and
experiences have been recommended by experts to im-
prove the expertise of countries to bring the private sec-
tor and the scientific community together in order to
overcome the AMR challenges by implementing the
one-health approach [29].
Health diplomacy not only plays a key role in bringing
this issue to the UN agenda, but also can help Iran to
address the challenges posed by neighboring countries
and sanctions. Though, it may might be hindered some-
times by sanctions. Iran should make use of health dip-
lomacy to increase its power and exclude the trans-
border challenges threatening the global security. The
increased AMR among refugees, asylum seekers, refugee
camps and detention facilities points out the need for
improved life conditions, access to health care, and ini-
tiatives to facilitate detection of and appropriate high-
quality treatment for AMR during transit and in host
countries as well [30]. Along with strengthening infra-
structure and financing such programs, keeping the door
open to health diplomacy and international collaboration
is essential for countries. The WHO country offices
could contribute significantly in using the power of dip-
lomacy [14].
Sanctions are also planned to isolate countries like
Iran, and this sounds incompatible with the spirit of the
GAP, as key informants also pointed to the sanctions’s
effect on the Iran’s international research collaborations.
This view is consistent with the literature which ensures
inability of Iranian scholars to publish scientifc outputs,
attend scientifc meetings, access to essential medical and
laboratory supplies and information resources. They
concluded that the academic boycotts violate re-
searchers’ autonomy and curtail progress. Free exchange
of ideas irrespective of creed is needed to optimize glo-
bal scientifc progress [25].
Iranian policymakers need to think of ways to treat the
vulnerability in order to confront these sanctions. For
example, despite the embargo, Cuba has produced better
health outcomes than most Latin American countries,
and they are comparable to most of developed countries
[23]. Emphasis on the primary care medicine, commu-
nity health literacy, universal coverage, and accessibility
to health services may explain the Cuban achievements
in health sector and the attained health outcomes [23].
Evidenced-based decision making should be in place
to ensure adopting best policies for supply, distribution,
and administration of medicines, equipment and infra-
structure based on the requirements and needs. Turning
the threat into opportunity in the presence of drug
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shortage may open windows of opportunity to turn ir-
rational use into a responsible use.
Our research was one of the first on AMR-related
policies in Iran. However, our findings need to be
interpreted with caution, as a long-term analysis is
necessary to investigate the effects of international
factors like sanctions on AMR in Iran. The perceived
exaggerated emphasis on the sanction in the study is
based on the participants’ perceptions. That is, the in-
creasing intensity of international sanctions against
Iran may have drawn the participants’ attentions more
towards the sanctions and their implications. Surely,
other national efforts, as rational use, are also key to
handling AMR, which were outside of this study
scope. Two related experts, due to their time con-
straints refused to participate.
Conclusion
AMR is now turning into a global challenge and more
or less all countries are facing with in some ways. LMICs
including Iran are even more susceptible to be affected
by AMR for many reasons. Therefore, international, re-
gional and national collaborations are inevitably
demanded to deal successfully with such an issue, given
its nature. This study has sought to elaborate on the role
of international factors in the AMR control and contain-
ment policies in Iran. As a result of the geopolitical situ-
ation of the country, a number of international factors,
mainly sanctions, are affecting its policies including
those related to the health sector and especially to AMR
management. Although the sanctions are not allegedly
targeting just the health system, the violation of people’s
right to health is still their direct or indirect effect. In
addition to the internal capability and efforts of the
country, the international factors were also highly enab-
ling and impowering in the AMR policy making and
knowledge sharing, which should be seriously attended
and reinforced. That is, tracing and reliance only on the
internal capacities might not guarantee the success of
AMR initiatives in Iran as the AMR control needs multi-
sides cooperation. Health diplomacy might be an effect-
ive channel to ease the collaboration with the neigh-
bours and non-neighbours. Disociation of health from
politics and valuing humanitaring aspects of health could
be of high use in the current management of AMR.
Considering the concern of externality in health care,
failure of any country to combat AMR will result in gen-
erating serious threats to global health, which should be
alarming for international health stewarding organiza-
tions. Furthermore, future researches are recommended
to identify potential strategies to improve the enabling
factors and ways to alleviate sanctions effect on AMR
control in countries.
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